least in the conventional formulation, the President does not exercise legislative discretion; he or she merely promulgates the ordinances. 6 The ordinance mechanism strengthens the executive's lawmaking powers in unconventional ways. It is more commonly found in presidential systems. 7 But Parliament still matters in the Indian version. After all, under Article 123, ordinances are temporary.
They become permanent only if Parliament enacts them into legislation. Proper parliamentary approval, therefore, is necessary for ordinances to become Acts of Parliament, and thereby, endure as law. India, it reassuringly seems, cannot permanently subject its people to laws that lack parliamentary mandate.
That, however, is a hasty conclusion. Notice that Article 123 places no numeric limits on 8 Consequential (and unpopular) changes were made to the law on land acquisition that was enacted with bipartisan support in 2013. 9 The two Houses should have voted on the ordinance after they reassembled in Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013) . Ramaswami Iyer, When Amendment Amounts to Nullification, Hindu, Jan. 15, 2015. 10 India has a bicameral system. The Modi Government has a majority in the Lower House. But it is in a minority in the Upper House. As a result, except for certain kinds of legislation (money Bills), the government is dependent on the support of opposition parties for successfully enacting legislation. Interestingly, the Janata Party-led government was a majority in name only. As a motley coalition of national and regional parties, it was less stable than the parties' overall seats (214) suggested. Governance suffered; it was never a priority anyway. Repromulgation continued while anxious ministers devoted their energies to staying in office. Three years later, in 1980, the Bihar Assembly was again dissolved. The Congress Party returned to power, but with a wafer thin majority. Nothing changed as a result. (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) reading is the lack of explicit prohibition. The Constitution grants a power to the executive.
"Reuse" isn't explicitly barred. Therefore, it may be reused. To forcefully read limitations into the provision is to do violence to it. It is a simple argument; it is also incorrect. That feature, they said, is so essential to the identity -and integrity -of the Constitution that any attempt to abrogate or tinker with it would be unconstitutional. Developed in 1973, the basic structure doctrine was meant to test the exercise of constituent power (and constitutional amendments). But two decades later it was extended to executive power (and executive actions). same provisions" is to exercise power colourably. It is a "fraud on the constitution", the Court ominously concluded.
The extension was innovated in S.R. Bommai v Union of India
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The basics are correct, and so is the conclusion. But clearly much more could have been said. The decision lacked analytical rigor. The sloppiness particularly shines through in the exception the Court gratuitously sliced out. 54 Repromulgation is lawful, the judges said, if a government is unable "to introduce and push through" a Bill to convert an ordinance. The government's inability may be for a number of reasons: "The Legislature [may have] too much legislative business", or the time at its disposal may be short. 55 In other words, if the legislature is too busy or a session is too short, repromulgation is justified.
This makes little sense. Who will judge busyness? Courts cannot do so; legislative chambers are authorized to conduct their business as they deem fit. Repromulgation is unconstitutional; it is so under all circumstances. This is a demanding conclusion. But it must face up to the possibility of disguised repromulgation.
What, after all, is a repromulgated ordinance? An identical law is an obvious example.
Introducing the same ordinance, without any changes, clearly amounts to repromulgation.
But a revised ordinance: is that repromulgation, too? Take Ordinance shall be promulgated by him under any circumstances". 62 Unlike the title test, the substantial similarity test is not a mechanical one. It seeks to really understand how -and the extent to which -a government has abused the ordinance mechanism. But its strength is also its weakness. Because it isn't a self-executing test, we now need a further standard by which to assess "substantial similarity". But any such test will likely prove inadequate; it will do little more than incubate litigation and uncertainty. Ordinances will remain in limbo for long durations while their similarities and differences are judicially dissected.
Perhaps an objective test is to look at legislative entries. 
